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Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a program that manages all firm risks in an 
integrated framework to control and coordinate offsetting risks. In this study, I provide the first 
archival evidence on how ERM affects firms’ day-to-day, routine operations. Using hand-collected 
ERM adoption data and inventory information, I examine whether firms with an ERM program 
experience an improvement in their inventory management. My findings suggest that ERM 
adoption is associated with greater inventory turnover ratios and lower inventory impairments. 
These results are robust to a range of models in addressing endogeneity concerns. Additionally, I 
find that ERM’s effect on inventory management is stronger among firms with greater financial 
distress, with less investments in innovation, or with higher information asymmetries, and when 
firms’ ERM program grows more mature. My study documents ERM’s real economic benefits to 
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Enterprise risk management (ERM) utilizes an integrated framework to manage all risks 
faced by a firm in a risk portfolio. An ERM program enables effective and efficient use of firms’ 
resources and reduces operational surprises and losses. Hence, ERM provides reasonable 
assurance for firms to achieve operations objectives (COSO 2004). ERM is also important in day-
to-day operational decisions to accelerate firm growth and enhance performance (COSO 2017).  
Prior research documents that ERM is associated with improvement in firm profitability 
ratios such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) (e.g., Callahan and Soileau 2017; 
Florio and Leoni 2017) as well as increased cost and revenue efficiencies for insurance companies 
(Grace, Leverty, Phillips, and Shimpi 2015). However, profitability and efficiencies are overall 
measures of firm operating performance. Firm operations span a wide range of activities, and it 
remains unknown which firms’ day-to-day operation contributes to the improved performance 
associated with ERM. Without pinpointing the solid benefits, an ambiguous view of ERM’s overall 
impact may restrain managers from perceiving ERM’s real effects, resulting in a hesitance to adopt 
ERM or an underutilization of ERM in practice (Beasley, Branson, and Hancock 2015, 2020; 
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2017). In this study, I open this black box by investigating 
how ERM substantiates the benefits to firm operations and examining ERM’s real effects.     
I focus on inventory management because it is vital to firm operations.1 Best practices in 
firm operations rely on proper inventory management, requiring sufficient inventory to be 
available at the time that it is demanded by customers or required for production at reasonable 
 
1 Inventory is one of the most expensive assets of companies, representing as much as 50 percent of total invested 
capital (Heizer, Render, and Munson 2020). 
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costs (Gaur, Fisher, and Raman 2005). Firms with improved inventory management see 
enhancements in their core operations (Feng, Li, McVay, and Skaife 2015). Therefore, in this study 
I investigate whether ERM affects firms’ day-to-day operations, focusing on inventory 
management, and shed some light on how ERM contributes to firm operating performance.  
I expect ERM to improve firm inventory management and provide three theoretical 
arguments for the expectation. First, an ERM program strengthens risk control and coordinates 
risk management activities across business units (Ellul and Yerramilli 2013). Hence, ERM reduces 
operational risk due to inadequate or failed processes, people, and systems, or from external events 
(Girling 2013; Lam 2014). It helps smooth production, ease planning, and reduce operational 
surprises and losses in inventory transactions, tracking, shipping, and handling, making future 
inventory costs more predictable. Second, ERM focuses on strategic planning and long-term 
sustainability. It fosters a risk culture that fights against myopic activities and encourages 
innovation that involves short-run uncertainties but potential long-run gains (COSO 2017, 2018; 
Xu and Xie 2018). Innovation improves inventory management because innovative products and 
processes expedite selling and production cycles, which makes inventory purchase, tracking, and 
valuation more efficient (Lee, Zhou, and Hsu 2015). Third, ERM improves the information 
environment. ERM utilizes advanced risk identification and evaluation methods, such as PESTLE 
and SWOT, in analyzing the firm’s external environment.2 Hence, firms with ERM are better able 
to forecast future customer demands driven by varying customer tastes, or changes in 
demographics, technology trends, or social events (Ittner and Michels 2017; Elliott 2018). With 
 
2 PESTLE is an acronym for the external environment categories that the approach covers: political, economic, 
sociological, technological, legal, and environmental. It provides a framework to systematically investigate the 
impact of external events in these categories on a firm and its competitors. The SWOT approach incorporates the 
internal factors of strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) and the external factors of opportunities (O) and threats (T). 
The SWOT approach is often employed for each of the six PESTLE categories. 
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improved sales forecast, firms reduce the likelihood of inventory shortages, as well as the storage 
costs and risk of obsolescence and impairment associated with excess inventory (Yano and Lee 
1995). Also, ERM reduces information asymmetries between firms and all parties involved in the 
supply chain including customers and suppliers. Enhanced communication and timely information 
sharing throughout the supply chain is key to effective inventory management because they help 
control expensive ordering capacity change adjustments including overtime, subcontracting, extra 
inventory, backorders, and equipment modifications (Cachón and Fisher 2000; DeHoratius and 
Raman 2008; Heizer et al. 2020).  
To answer my research questions, I gather a sample of firms that appeared in the Standard 
and Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500) for any fraction of time from 2001 to 2017, excluding the financial 
and utility industries. I hand-collect the ERM status for the sample firms systematically from 
newswire and firms’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, complemented by 
Google searches. I code ERM as a binary variable that equals one in the years that a firm has an 
ERM program in place, and zero otherwise. 
Following prior literature (Huson and Nanda 1995; Chen, Frank, and Wu 2005; Easton 
2009; Feng et al. 2015), I use inventory turnover and inventory impairment to measure firm 
inventory management. I employ a FIFO (first in, first out) adjusted turnover ratio and industry-
adjusted turnover ratio to measure inventory turnover, defined as the cost of goods sold divided by 
average inventory. Inventory impairment represents obsolete inventory with a lost market value 
that firms have to write down or write off. I manually search dozens of impairment-related 
keywords in firms’ SEC filings and employ three measures: a dummy variable indicating whether 
an impairment exists, a continuous variable of impairment magnitude, and an industry-adjusted 
impairment magnitude.  
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My baseline regression models suggest that ERM significantly improves firm inventory 
turnover and reduces inventory impairment, controlling for a range of firm characteristics and 
internal control over financial reporting (ICFR).3 My findings suggest that ERM increases the 
number of times inventory turned annually by around 23%, translating to 38.1 million U.S. dollars 
of cost saving. Also, ERM decreases the magnitude of inventory impairments by 3.03% of the 
average annual FIFO inventory, translating to a cost saving of nearly 50.9 million U.S. dollars. 
I also find that ERM’s effect on inventory management is more pronounced among firms 
with greater financial distress, with less investments in innovation, or with higher information 
asymmetries. The cross-sectional results provide empirical support to my three theoretical 
arguments for the relation between ERM and inventory management.  
To address the endogeneity concerns of reverse causality and omitted variables, I use an 
instrumental variable approach (2SLS) and my results persist. Moreover, to alleviate the concern 
that firms self-select to adopt an ERM program, and that I use a linear probability model for an 
indicator in the first stage of 2SLS, I utilize a Heckman two-step model, also known as the 
treatment effect model, and my results still hold. Additionally, the propensity score matching 
analysis supports my findings that ERM improves inventory management. 
To address the concern that my ERM measure is of a binary nature and has limited 
variation, I develop ERM maturity measures in an attempt to capture the quality of a firm’s ERM 
implementation. The measures are based on the notion that a firm improves the quality of its ERM 
program over time through experimental learning and experience accumulation and sharing 
(Eckles, Hoyt, and Miller 2014; Eastman and Xu 2021). My results show that the economic 
 
3 ERM incorporates ICFR in its framework (COSO 2017) and literature (Feng el at. 2015) documents that ICFR 
improves inventory management. Hence, it is important to control for ICFR in our models to show that ERM has 
incremental effect on inventory management over ICFR.    
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benefits of ERM adoption on inventory management substantially increase over time when a firm’s 
ERM program matures. 
My research makes several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first archival study to empirically investigate the effect of ERM on firms’ 
day-to-day, routine operations. It provides direct evidence on how ERM contributes to the 
improvement in firms’ operating performance documented by prior literature (e.g., Callahan and 
Soileau 2017; Florio and Leoni 2017; Grace et al. 2015). Also, most existing studies on ERM focus 
on the financial sector (e.g., Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011; Baxter, Befard, Hoitash, and Yezegel 
2013; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013; Bailey, Collins, and Abbott 2018), and whether the findings can 
be generalized to other industries is questionable (Eastman and Xu 2021). I extend the scope to 
firms in various industries and examine a research question that cannot be answered by the 
financial industry—whether ERM impacts the real economy. My results that ERM improves firms’ 
day-to-day operations provide a positive answer to the question.  
Further, despite prior evidence that ERM increases firms’ overall value and performance, 
such as Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and efficiencies (e.g., Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011; Callahan and 
Soileau 2017), managers still hesitate to adopt ERM or underutilize ERM in practice (Beasley et 
al. 2015, 2020; Cohen et al. 2017). According to surveys that follow up for more than ten years 
(Beasley et al. 2015, 2020), one of the leading barriers for firms to embrace ERM is “lack of 
perceived value.” The overall performance measures in prior literature only provide an overarching 
view of ERM’s general impact, making it difficult for managers to truly perceive ERM’s real 
effects. My findings that ERM improves inventory management pinpoint and substantiate the solid 
benefits of ERM to firm operations, helping managers perceive and appreciate the value of ERM.  
Second, I contribute to the literature on firm operations and inventory management. 
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Operations research considers risk management in management science models (e.g., 
optimization, simulation, etc.) to develop specific operation decisions (such as the best ordering 
quantity and production planning under uncertainties) and suggests firms utilize the models in their 
operations (Wu and Olson 2008; Kim, Lu, Kvam, and Tsao 2011; Mirzapour Al-e-hashem, 
Malekly, and Aryanezhad 2011; Wu, Olson, and Dolgui 2015). Most of this literature utilizes case 
studies or field surveys (Choi, Ye, Zhao, and Luo 2015). However, it remains an empirical question 
whether firms with an ERM program indeed experience improvement in their operations when 
using such management science models in decision-making. I provide systematic archival 
evidence supporting the modeling work in operations research using a large panel of firms.  
Most of the existing studies on inventory management come from industry-specific case 
studies, surveys, and questionnaires (e.g., Anderson, Fitzsimons, and Simester 2006; Blome and 
Schoenherr 2011), or examine the impacts of inventory management on firm performance (e.g., 
Huson and Nanda 1995; Chen et al. 2005; Alan, Gao, and Gaur 2014). The studies highlight the 
importance of effective inventory management. Thus, it is crucial to understand the driving force 
of effective inventory management. I extend the literature by presenting an institutional 
framework—ERM—that drives inventory management improvement. 
Finally, I empirically support the notion that ERM is broader than ICFR in nature (COSO 
2004; 2017) by delivering evidence that ERM further improves inventory management 
incrementally to ICFR. I argue that my sample of S&P 500 firms provides a clean setting to test 
the incremental effect of ERM over ICFR because these firms mostly have strong internal control 
so that ICFR should not matter for them.4 My results indicate that ERM is broader in assuring the 
 
4 According to Table 2, over 96% of our sample firms do not have any internal control material weaknesses. Hence, 
we can attribute the effect of inventory management in our sample to ERM above and beyond internal control.  
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operations objectives that ERM and ICFR share in common, on top of the strategic objectives that 
ERM strives to achieve in addition to internal control (COSO 2004, 2013). 5 This finding is 
important since ERM is underemphasized and underutilized in practice by firm management and 
auditors (Cohen et al. 2017). Given the mandatory nature of firms’ ICFR disclosures and voluntary 
ERM adoption, it calls for more attention from the standard-setters and practitioners.   
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
on ERM and inventory management, and develops hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes my data and 
research design. Chapter 4 presents the results of my baseline regression model as well as cross-
sectional analysis. Chapter 5 reports the tests to alleviate endogeneities. Chapter 6 investigates the 
impact of ERM maturity on inventory management. Chapter 7 tests if the results are robust to the 




5 In the COSO (2004) ERM framework, ERM assists firms to achieve four categories of objectives: strategic, 
operations, reporting, and compliance. In the COSO (2013) internal control framework, internal control assists firms 
to achieve three categories of objectives: operations, reporting, and compliance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
This chapter provides a review of relevant literature including a section on Erm literature 
and a section on inventory managmenet literature. In the last section, I develop the main hypothesis 
of my research. 
 Enterprise Risk Management Literature 
ERM is a holistic risk management approach that employs an integrated framework to 
identify and address all types of risk that an organization might encounter (COSO 2004). ERM is 
a process applied in both strategy setting and throughout the firm that provides justifiable 
assurance regarding the achievement of firms’ goals. To this aim, ERM defines a system of 
monitoring and learning that addresses internal control, strategy-setting, governance, 
communicating with stakeholders, and measuring performance (COSO 2017). While traditional 
risk management practices aim to manage risks within each business unit separately, ERM handles 
risks in an integrated framework across the entity (Nocco and Stulz 2006). As such, in contrast to 
the traditional methods that ignore potential across-silos offsetting risks, ERM utilizes natural 
hedges to effectively manage enterprise risks. 
Earliest adoptions of ERM program date back to the 1990s and were concentrated among 
financial firms (i.e., insurers and banks). Later on, a series of major events attracted attentions 
towards risk management and accelerated the adoption of ERM among other industries. The 
corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s triggered the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 inspired regulators to raise risk management 
responsibilities of the board of directors and senior executives. In 2008, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
included ERM adoption in its corporate credit ratings (S&P 2008). In 2010, the U.S. Securities 
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and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Rule 33-9089 that requires listing firms to disclose 
details about the Board of Directors’ role in risk oversight as well as the firm’s risk management 
approach in the proxy statements. Corporate failure incidences rooted in mismanagement of risks 
on the one hand, and the effectiveness of ERM programs on the other hand, convinced more 
managers to consider ERM seriously. By the end of 2017, more than 60% of S&P 500 firms have 
adopted ERM (see Figure 1).  
ERM studies generally fall into three categories. First, studies investigating the factors that 
determine ERM adoption. These studies find a positive association between the decision to engage 
in ERM and factors such as firm size (Colquitt et al. 1999), leverage (Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003), 
board independence (Beasley et al. 2005), institutional ownership (Pagach and Warr 2011), and 
earnings volatility (Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011). Second, research that document the implications 
of ERM value creation. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) find empirical evidence that ERM adoption 
significantly increases Tobin’s Q. Other studies show that not only the adoption, but also the 
quality (Baxter et al. 2013; Ai et al. 2018) and the maturity (Farrell and Gallagher 2015) of ERM 
programs are associated with higher Tobin’s Q. The third group of studies aim to explain the 
mechanisms through which ERM creates value. Prior literature documents that ERM creates value 
through its negative association with stock return volatility risk (Eckles et al. 2014), default risk 
(Lundqvist and Vilhelmsson 2016), and cost of capital (Berry-Stölzle and Xu 2018), as well as its 
positive association with resilience to financial crisis (Aebi et al. 2012), cost efficiency, return on 
asset (Grace et al. 2015), transparency (Wade et al. 2015), and innovation efficiency (Xu and Xie 
2018). Moreover, the adoption of ERM significantly improves the quality of financial reporting 
and internal controls (Cohen et al. 2017), reduce audit fees, audit delay, and the likelihood of late 
filing (Bailey et al. 2018), and deters financial reporting misconduct (Eastman et al. 2020). 
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Despite the steady surge in ERM adoption across diverse industries, existing literature 
mainly concentrates on financial firms and specifically insurance companies. The regulations 
specific to financial firms along with the unique risk-centric business model of insurance 
companies raise doubts regarding the implication of previously documented results among other 
industries. The generalizability of previous results is therefore limited, and further research on 
broader samples is called for. 
 Inventory Management Literature 
Inventory management is vastly studied in accounting and operations management 
literature. Inventory turnover ratio—defined as the firm’s cost of goods sold divided by average 
inventory holdings—is commonly used to measure inventory management performance, and to 
conduct industry competitive analysis (Easton 2009). Balakrishnan et al. (1996) show that 
inventory turnover is positively correlated with capital intensity and suggest that firms investing 
in more fixed assets need to generate higher inventory turnover in order to cover their high 
overhead costs. Gaur et al. (2005) document a negative association between inventory turnover 
and gross margin and explain that gross margin can be related to inventory turnover directly 
(through determining the optimal service level) or indirectly (through price, product variety, and 
product life cycle). Gaur and Kesavan (2009) report a positive association between sales growth 
and inventory turnover. Based on them, higher sales growth implies greater demand for products 
and hence lower inventory holdings. Feng et al. (2015) show that inventory turnover is negatively 
associated with sales volatility and explain that firms with highly volatile sales face uncertainty in 
demand and have difficulties holding efficient inventory levels. Feng et al. (2015) also document 
that the number of geographic and operating segments, firm age, and engagement in foreign sale 
are all negatively associated with inventory turnover. Lee et al. (2015) propose that more 
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innovative firms have higher inventory turnover ratios. 
The quality of internal control over financial reporting has a positive association with 
inventory turnover. Doyle et al. (2007) suggest that higher financial reporting quality improvers 
firms’ inventory turnover. Feng et al. (2015) show that having inventory-related material 
weaknesses significantly decreases inventory turnover. They explain that since inventory-related 
material weaknesses indicate inaccuracy in inventory valuation or tracking, it is expected that 
managers, relying on this inaccurate information, make decisions that result in inefficient 
inventory management. 
Another stream of research on inventory management seeks to predict future performance.  
Huson and Nanda (1995) find that, holding profit margins constant, higher inventory turnover 
ratios are associated with more profitable operations. Chen et al. (2005) show that firms with 
abnormally high inventory holdings have abnormally poor long-term stock returns. Alan et al. 
(2014) find that inventory productivity strongly predicts future stock returns. They show that a 
zero-cost portfolio consisting of long (short) position in highest (lowest) inventory productive 
firms earns more than 1% average monthly abnormal return. 
 Hypotheses Development  
I expect that ERM improves inventory management and provide three theoretical 
arguments for the expectation. First, ERM involves an integrated risk management framework that 
mitigates firm operational surprises. ERM involves a strengthened risk identification technique 
and coordinates risk management activities across business units (Ellul and Yerramilli 2013). 
Hence, ERM adopters may spot certain previously overlooked operational hazards that fall into 
cracks of traditional risk silos and in a timelier manner, reducing their inventory holdings 
accordingly. Also, less surprises in operations and finances helps managers make more efficient 
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decisions including those related to inventory management. Consistent with the view, operations 
research documents that ERM reduces firm operational risks (Mikes 2009; Huang et al. 2011; 
Blome and Schoenherr 2011).  
Second, ERM adoption fosters innovative activities. ERM reduces the managerial short-
termism problem through mitigating managers’ career concerns, and increases managers 
willingness to make long-term beneficial strategic decisions such as engaging in innovative 
activities. Moreover, stakeholder orientation inherent in ERM framework cultivates a work 
environment of long-term commitment that encourages engagement in experimentation (Tian and 
Wang 2014; Flammer and Kacperczyk 2016), encouraging workers to adopt long-term horizons 
and create novel ideas (Turban and Greening 1997). Consequently, ERM triggers the creation and 
communication of new ideas, and enables managers to make more informed decisions regarding 
innovation projects and accelerate the turnover of innovative ideas (COSO 2012). Consistent with 
the view, Xu and Xie (2018) document a positive association between ERM adoption and 
innovation.  
Balakrishnan et al. (1996) and Huson and Nanda (1995) show that adopting just-in-time 
(JIT) manufacturing, which is a type of process innovation that improves the supply chain, 
positively impacts inventory turnover. Lee et al. (2015) show that not only process innovation but 
also product innovation positively impacts inventory turnover ratio. Process innovation improves 
inventory turnover by facilitating ordering/delivery and generating flexible, collaborative, and 
team-oriented workflow, which expedites the operations and reduces inventory holdings in the 
production cycle (Lee et al. 2015). Moreover, if a process innovation reduces production costs 
through decreasing waste/buffer in operations, it will help the firm lower the price of its products 
and, ultimately, increase its sales. Product innovation involves introducing new products that 
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satisfy everchanging customer demands, and therefore boosts sales. While sales increase may lead 
to an increase in inventory, such increase is usually less than proportional because of the economy 
of scale (Olivares and Cachón 2009) and inventory turns faster. Due to short product life cycles in 
recent decades, product innovation may have a short-term impact on inventory turnover. Yet, if 
the firm creates a work environment that consistently seeks making innovative products, one can 
expect impacts on inventory management to remain persistent.  
Third, ERM improves external information environment and reduces information 
asymmetries between firms and stakeholders, including customers and suppliers in the supply 
chain. To keep inventory holdings at optimal levels, managers need to have access to accurate and 
punctual information on inventory holdings, transactions, tracking, shipping, and handling. Yet, 
many firms suffer from inaccurate inventory records. DeHoratius and Raman (2008) suggest that 
inventory auditing practices can improve the accuracy on inventory records. ERM requires regular 
internal auditing. Moreover, ERM assesses and incorporates firm-specific key risks in designing 
safety systems, employee training programs, procedures, and checks and balances. Consequently, 
ERM adoption improves the quality and accuracy of operational records including those related to 
inventory. Ineffective sharing of information throughout the supply chain is another factor that can 
deteriorate inventory management performance (Cachón and Fisher 2000). ERM reduces the 
information asymmetry among all stakeholders, including those within the supply chain. Enhanced 
communication and timely information sharing throughout the supply chain is key to effective 
inventory management because they help control expensive ordering capacity change adjustments 
including overtime, subcontracting, extra inventory, backorders, and equipment modifications 
(Cachón and Fisher 2000; DeHoratius and Raman 2008; Heizer et al. 2020).  
Based on the above three arguments, I propose my first hypothesis as follows: 
14 
Hypothesis 1. ERM adoption improves inventory management. 
Eckles et al. (2014) investigate the association between ERM adoption and stock return 
volatility, and show that the reduction in return volatility becomes stronger over time after the 
adoption of ERM. They argue that their results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that ERM 
implementation is a complicated process that matures over time and that it takes time for the 
adopters to fully realize the economic benefits of ERM. Based on this argument, I expect the 
impacts of ERM adoption on inventory management to intensify over time. This leads to my 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. As a firm’s ERM program grows more mature over time, its impacts on 





DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter provides information on the sources of data and describes the sample selection 
process, and the methodology used in my baseline analyses. 
 Data 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure. I begin with a sample of 12,367 firm-
year observations (864 unique firms) on all firms that appeared in the S&P 500 index during any 
fraction of time from 2001 to 2017. I apply certain sample screening procedures to the initial 
dataset. Following the inventory literature (i.e., Demerjian et al. 2012; Cheng et al. 2018), I remove 
financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999; 2,234 observations on 158 unique firms) and utility firms 
(SIC codes 4900 to 4999; 838 observations on 56 unique firms) from the sample. Next, I drop 
observations with missing information on internal control variables (2,634 observations), resulting 
in an analysis period that begins in 2004.6 Finally, I remove observations with missing values on 
explanatory variables (1,746 observations), yielding in the final sample of 4,915 firm-years (513 
unique firms) from 2004 to 2017.  
I use several sources to collect the data used in this study. I obtained firm financial 
statement data from Compustat annual and quarterly files, and business and geographic segments 
data from Compustat segments files. Data on daily stock return and firm age are attained from 
CRSP. I collect data on internal control material weakness from Audit Analytics and institutional 
ownership from firms’ 13-F filings. I retrieve analysts’ data from I/B/E/S. 
 
6 That is due to the fact that our sample firms, all of which are accelerated filers, have been subjected to Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Section 404(a) and 404(b) since 2004. 
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 Construction of ERM Adoption Variable  
I follow the ERM literature (Eckles et al. 2014; Berry-Stölzle and Xu 2018; Kamiya, Kang, 
Kim, Milidonis, and Stulz 2021) and construct an indicator variable to measure firms’ ERM status. 
Specifically, I use the following phrases to capture signs of ERM adoption: “enterprise risk 
management,” “chief risk,” “risk committee,” “risk management committee,” “strategic risk 
management,” “consolidated risk management,” “holistic risk management,” and “integrated risk 
management.”7 For all firm-years in my initial sample, I search for disclosure of any of the above-
mentioned phrases in the news media captured by Factiva, supplemented by Google searches. I 
also search the U.S. SEC filings—including, but not limited to, 10-K, 8-K, and proxy statements—
for the same set of phrases. Next, I manually review reports and news in chronological order to 
check for the earliest convincing implication of ERM adoption.8 For ERM-adopters, I also check 
reports and news on years after the engagement of ERM and find that none of my sample firms 
have terminated their ERM programs at any later time. Figure 1 presents the historical trend of 
ERM adoption among S&P 500 firms in my final sample of 513 unique firms. 
 Methodology 
As my main analysis, I use the following baseline regression to test for the association 
between adopting ERM and inventory turnover ratio.  
InvtTurnRatioi,t = α + δERMi,t-1 + γERM_Everi + βControlsi,t-1 + Year Dummies + 
Industry Dummies + εi,t + εi,t    (Eq. 1) 
In equation (1), firms and years are indexed by i and t, respectively, and Controlsi,t-1 represents the 
 
7 Instead of the term “chief risk officer” suggested in ERM literature, we use “chief risk” in order to capture other 
relevant terms such as “Chief Risk, Compliance and Ethics Officer”, “Chief Risk and Strategy Officer”, and “Chief 
Risk Management Officer”. 
8 Manual screening is necessary as in many cases ERM-related terms are used, but in a different context. 
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following vector of independent variables: 
Controlsi,t-1 = [ GrossMargini,t-1, CapitalIntensityi,t-1, Sizei,t-1, Book-to-Marketi,t-1,  ROAi,t-1,  
Lossi,t -1,  SalesGrowthi,t-1, SalesVolatilityi,t-1, Agei,t-1, ForeignSalesi,t-1, Segmentsi,t-1, 
Auditori,t-1, Invt_MWICi,t-1,  β13 Rev_MWICi,t-1,  β14 Other_MWICi,t-1 ]    (Eq. 2) 
Detailed descriptions of all the variables are presented in the appendix. In selecting the 
control variables, I follow Feng et al (2015). Since firms that are able to maintain high gross 
margins tend to have lower inventory turnover (Gaur et al. 2005), I expect the coefficient on 
GrossMargin to be significant and negative. Firms with high capital intensity need to maintain a 
high inventory turnover ratio to cover their overwhelming fixed costs (Balakrishnan et al. 1996) 
and hence I expect a significant and positive coefficient on CapitalIntensity. Gaur and Kesavan 
(2009) suggest that higher sales growth implies greater product demand and therefore lower 
inventory holdings. Consequently, I expect the coefficient on SalesGrowth to be significant and 
positive. I follow Feng et al (2015) and include other firm characteristics such as complexity 
(Segments and ForeignSales), firm age (Age), audit quality (Auditor), and resource availability 
(ROA and Loss) in my model, as well as three indicators that capture disclosures of material 
weaknesses over internal control (MWIC); inventory-related MWIC dummy (Invt_MWIC), 
revenue related MWIC dummy (Rev_MWIC), and the natural log of the number of other MWIC 
(Other_MWIC). Feng et al (2015) document a negative association between inventory-related 
MWIC (Invt_MWIC) and inventory turnover ratio. Since ERM encompasses internal control 
within its framework (COSO 2004; Cohen et al. 2017) and has additional features that contribute 
further to the impact of ERM on inventory turnover, I do not expect the same results in my 
regression model. 
In equation (1), InvtTurnRatio represents each of the following two dependent variables: 
1) Invt_Turnover, defined as the cost of goods sold divided by average annual FIFO inventory, 
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where the annual average is computed using beginning and ending FIFO inventory. 9  2) 
Invt_AdjTurn, defined as the firm’s Invt_Turnover less the median industry-year Invt_Turnover, 
where industry is defined using Fama and French 30-industry classification.10, 11 I use equation (1) 
to run two separate OLS regressions using my two dependent variables.  
My variable of interest, ERM, is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has an active 
ERM program, and zero otherwise. With reference to Hypothesis (1), I expect δ to be significant 
and positive no matter which of the two dependent variables is used in equation (1). ERM_Ever is 
a time-invariant dummy variable that equals one if the firm has ever adopted ERM, and zero 
otherwise. ERM_Ever controls for the differences in time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics 
across firms with and without ERM program. By including both ERM and ERM_Ever in the 
regression, I isolate the incremental impact of ERM adoption on inventory turnover ratio. In 
addition to the control variables, I include both year and industry fixed effects (using Fama and 
French 30-industry classification) in my model, and cluster standard errors at the firm level.  
  
 
9 Following Feng et al. (2015) we adjust all LIFO (last in, first out) inventory amounts to its FIFO (first in, first out) 
basis using the disclosure of LIFO reserves. Consistently, cost of goods sold and gross margin are also adjusted to 
their FIFO basis. 
10 Using median to define our industry-adjusted dependent variables is based on Feng et al. (2015). As a robustness 
check, we also define Invt_AdjTurn using industry-year mean and re-run all our tests. Results are robust to this 
change. 




In this chapter, descriptive statistics and baseline results are presented. Moreover, a cross-
sectional analysis is provided with the aim to identify the channels through which ERM adoption 
impacts inventory management. 
 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the main analysis for the  
full sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ERM  
 has a mean of 0.418 which implies that out of 4,915 firm-year observations in my sample, 2,053 
observations have an active ERM program. In terms of the number of firms, 314 unique firms 
(61.2% of the total of 513 firms) in my sample have adopted ERM by the end of their 2017 fiscal 
year. The mean (median) for inventory turnover is 13.933 (5.525) which is very similar to the 
mean (median) of 14.032 (5.955) in Feng et al. (2015). The distributions of other key variables are 
comparable to those found in prior studies (e.g., Gaur et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2015) with the 
exception of material weaknesses variables. The frequency of observations with inventory (non-
inventory) related material weakness over financial reporting in my study is 0.6% (2.8%); 
however, Feng et al. (2015) report the considerably larger rates of 1.8% (5.3%). This difference is 
consistent with prior literature. My sample focuses on extremely large (S&P 500) firms, and larger 
firms are more likely to have effective ICFR (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007) 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for firm-years with (column (I)) and without (column 
(II)) ERM program. Column (III) shows the differences in the means and medians across ERM 
status. The mean and median of Invt_Turnover and Invt_AdjTurn are significantly higher for ERM-
adopter firm-years which is consistent with my hypothesis that the adoption of ERM is associated 
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with higher inventory turnover ratios. Given the average annual FIFO inventory holdings of 1873.6 
million dollars in my sample, the 2.155 (1.315) units difference in the means of Invt_Turnover 
(Invt_AdjTurn) between the two groups has economic significance as well.  
While firm-years with an active ERM program consist 41.8% of my sample, they account 
for less than 17%, 16%, and 23% of observations with inventory-related, revenue-related, and 
other-related material weaknesses, respectively. These results imply that adopting ERM can 
considerably improve the quality of internal control over financial reporting, and hence, decrease 
incidences of material weaknesses. 
Table 4 presents Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) correlations among the dependent 
variables, my main independent variable (ERM), and the rest of the independent variables. As 
expected, ERM adoption is positively correlated with inventory turnover. Moreover, consistent 
with the literature, I find gross margin and sales growth (capital intensity) to be negatively 
(positively) correlated with inventory turnover. 
 Baseline Regressions Results 
Table 5 presents the results for my baseline regression, presented by equation (1), on the 
association between ERM adoption and inventory turnover. We find the coefficient on my ERM 
indicator variable (ERM) to be positive and significant (3.224 with a t-statistic of 2.23 when using 
Invt_Turnover as the dependent variable, and 3.066 with a t-statistic of 2.13 when using 
Invt_AdjTurn as the dependent variable). This result indicates that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
inventory turnover ratio - either unadjusted (column (I)), or industry-adjusted (column (II)) - is 
significantly higher for firms with an active ERM program. The magnitude of the coefficient 
suggests that the inventory turnover ratio of a firm with an active ERM program is, on average, 
about 3.2 units higher than that of a firm without an ERM program. Since the average inventory 
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turnover ratio in my final sample is 13.933, the coefficient of 3.224 implies that for an average 
firm in my sample, adoption of ERM increases the number of times inventory is turned throughout 
the year by around 23% (= 3.224 / 13.933). This is equivalent to a decrease in days inventory 
outstanding from 26.2 days to 21.3 days. Given the average annual FIFO inventory holdings of 
1,873.6 million dollars in my final sample, for an average firm in the sample, the adoption of ERM 
decreases annual FIFO inventory to 1,492.3 million dollars, all else equal. 12  Assuming a  
cost of capital of 10%, this translates to 38.1 million dollars of cost saving per year  
(= (1,873.6 - 1,492.3) × 10%). 
The coefficients on ERM_Ever are insignificant suggesting that compared to non-ERM 
firms (ERM_Ever =0), ERM adapters (ERM_Ever =1) do not have a systematically higher 
inventory turnover ratio prior to their ERM adoption. As such, the reverse causality seems 
unlikely. Consistent with existing literature (Nissim and Penman 2001; Gaur et al. 2005; Feng et 
al. 2015), I find significant negative coefficients on GrossMargin, Size, Book-to-Market, and 
Segments, and significant positive coefficients on CapitalIntensity and SaleGrowth. 
 Cross-Sectional Tests 
I propose that ERM improves inventory turnover through three channels and use cross-
sectional settings to test my propositions. I define a proxy for each channel, and for each proxy, I 
divide my sample into high versus low subsamples where high (low) implies higher (lower) than 
the industry-year median value for that proxy. Next, I re-estimate equation (1) on each subsample, 
separately. Each panel of Table 6 represents one of the channels.  
The first channel (Panel A) is related to the inherent risk management function of the ERM 
 
12 After-adoption inventory holdings = (13.933 / (13.933 + 3.224)) × 1,873.6 = 1,492.3 million U.S. dollars.  
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program. ERM provides the firm with an integrated framework that mitigates operational and 
financial surprises. Fewer surprises in operations and finances help managers make more efficient 
decisions including those related to inventory management. Firms under financial distress use 
aggressive pricing to convert their inventory holdings into cash (Hendel 1996; Whitaker 1999), 
and a reduction in inventory holdings is more noticeable among firms that manage to resolve their 
financial distress (Steinker et al. 2016). As such, I argue that ERM’s function in reducing 
operational risk is more important in firms with financial distress than firms without it. Hence, I 
expect the impact of ERM adoption on inventory turnover to be more pronounced among firms 
with financial distress. I use Ohlson's O-score (Ohlson 1980; Griffin and Lemmon 2002) to 
measure financial distress. As Panel A of Table 6 shows, consistent with my arguments, estimated 
coefficients on ERM are positive and significant (insignificant) among firms with a higher (lower) 
probability of default. The coefficient difference between the two subsamples is significant at 1% 
level. 
Fostering innovation is the second channel through which ERM adoption increases 
inventory turnover. ERM reduces the managerial short-termism problem through mitigating 
managers’ career concerns and increases managers' willingness to make long-term beneficial 
strategic decisions such as engaging in innovative activities. ERM framework has built-in features 
that trigger persistent collaboration and renovation in operational processes, as well as a long-term 
strategic view towards product competition in the market. Hence, I expect ERM to facilitate 
innovation in both products and processes and consequently increase inventory turnover. 
Therefore, I propose that the impact of ERM adoption on inventory turnover should be more 
pronounced among firms that invest less in innovative activities. I use research and development 
expenditures scaled by sales (R&DExpnd) to measure investment in innovation. Panel B of Table 
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6 shows that coefficients on ERM are significant among firms investing less in innovation and 
insignificant among firms investing more in innovation. The coefficient difference between the 
two subsamples is significant at 5% level.  
The role of ERM in enhancing the accuracy and availability of information builds the third 
channel that contributes to the impact of ERM adoption on inventory turnover. ERM provides 
managers with accurate and punctual information on inventory holdings, transactions, tracking, 
shipping, and handling, and integrates risk-adjusted information into future plans which itself 
reduces forecast errors (Ittner and Michels 2017) and enables managers to better plan for their 
inventory holdings. Consequently, ERM adoption improves the quality and accuracy of 
operational records including those related to inventory. Further, ERM reduces information 
asymmetries among all stakeholders, including those within the supply chain, improving inventory 
management performance (Cachón and Fisher 2000). Therefore, I expect the positive association 
between ERM adoption and inventory turnover to be more noticeable among firms with uncertain 
information environment. I use forecast dispersion (ForecastDispersion) as the proxy for 
information asymmetry, where greater forecast dispersion implies greater asymmetry. Panel C of 
Table 6 supports my expectation by showing significant (insignificant) estimated coefficients on 





One important concern with my results thus far is that the adoption of ERM is an 
endogenous choice by firms. If there are unobservable correlated omitted variables that affect both 
the choice of firm to adopt ERM and the firm’s inventory turnover, then the documented 
association between ERM and inventory turnover in Table 5 could be biased and possibly spurious. 
To address endogeneity, I use instrumental variable estimation, treatment effect model, and 
propensity score matching. 
 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
In my instrumental variable estimation, ERM is instrumented in the first-stage using the 
ratio of ERM adopters within a firm’s industry in a particular year (ERM_IndRatio) as the 
instrumental variable. This instrument is likely to be positively correlated with ERM because a 
greater ratio of ERM adoption within the firm’s industry peers increases the chance of adopting 
ERM. In addition to satisfying the relevance condition, the ERM adoption rate within the industry 
does not directly affect individual firms’ inventory turnover. In that capacity, I suggest that the 
instrument affects the second-stage inventory turnover variable only through its effect on the ERM 
adoption decision, thus satisfying the exogeneity condition.  
In the first stage of the 2SLS estimation, I regress ERM on the instrumental variable 
(ERM_IndRatio), the vector of control variables defined in (2), and year and industry dummies. 
Results of the first stage are presented in column (I) of Table 7. Consistent with my arguments, 
first stage results show that ERM_IndRatio has a significant positive association with the decision 
to adopt ERM. 
In the second stage, I regress inventory turnover ratio (Invt_Turnover and Invt_AdjTurn, in 
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two separate regressions) on the predicted values of ERM from the first stage, while including the 
same set of control variables and industry and year dummies as in the first stage. Columns (II) and 
(III) of Table 7 represent the results of the second stage using Invt_Turnover and Invt_AdjTurn as 
the dependent variable, respectively. Based on the results, after controlling for endogeneity, ERM 
has a statistically and economically significant impact on inventory turnover ratio. In both 
columns, the coefficient is significant and positive implying that the adoption of ERM is associated 
with an increase in inventory turnover ratio – either unadjusted or industry-adjusted. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 is robust to the use of the instrumental variable. 
 Treatment Effect Model 
To alleviate the concern of the endogenous choice of adopting ERM, and to address the 
concern of linear probability regression in modeling a dummy variable (ERM) using the 2SLS 
method, I use a treatment effect model (Chang et al. 2009; Kini et al. 2009; Eckles et al. 2014; 
Acharya and Xu 2017; Berry- Stölzle and Xu 2018).  
In the first stage of the treatment effect model, I use a subset of my explanatory variables, 
the instrumental variable (ERM_IndRatio), and a set of eight firm-specific variables13 to estimate 
ERM using a probit model. 
ERMi,t-1 = α0  + γ (ERM_IndRatio)i,t-1 + α1 DailyRtnVol,t-1 + α2CashRatioi,t-1+ 
α3Opacityi,t-1 + α4CashFlowVoli,t-1 + α5Z-scorei,t-1 + α6 ValueChangei,t-1 + α7 
Leveragei,t-1 + α8 InstOwnership,t-1 + α9Inventory-MWi,t-1 + α10Revenue-MWi,t-1 + 
 
13 These eight variables are the determinants of the adoption of ERM adoption. In selecting these variables, we 
follow prior literature. (e.g., Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011; Pagach and Warr 2011). The variables are: 1) DailyRtnVol: 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns over the year, 2) CashRatio: cash plus short 
term investments divided by book value of assets, 3) Opacity: intangible assets divided by total assets, 4) 
CashFlowVol: natural log of the standard deviation of the error term from a regression of a firm’s quarterly 
operating cash flow on the prior quarter’s operating cash flow, scaled by total assets, 5) Z-score: Altman’s Z-score 
6) ValueChange: annual growth in market value, 7) Leverage: book value of liabilities divided by book value of 
assets 8) InstOwnership: percentage of equity held by institutions. 
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α11Other-MWi,t-1 + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εi,t (Eq. 3) 
I model the probability of ERM adoption in the first stage using equation (3), and control for the 
potential self-selection bias due to the omitted variable issue by including the Inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR) derived from the first stage in the second stage (equation (1)). 
Table 8 shows the results of the treatment effect model in the association between ERM 
adoption and inventory turnover ratio. I present the first-stage results in column (I). The coefficient 
on the inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant, which suggests that self-selection can be a 
serious concern. Column (II) and Column (III) of Table 8 show the second-stage results using 
Invt_Turnover and Invt_AdjTurn as the dependent variable, respectively. The results document a 
positive association between ERM and inventory turnover. Moreover, using this model, the 
coefficients on both dependent variables become significant at one percent level (p-value <0.01).  
 Propensity Score Matching 
To determine whether firm-years with an active ERM program would have generated a 
significantly lower inventory turnover ratio had they not had an ERM program, I use the propensity 
score matching (PSM) technique. In doing so, I use a logit model to estimate the probabilities of 
possessing an active ERM program. The logit estimation includes all the independent variables 
defined in vector (2), as well as industry and year dummies. Following Blanco and Wehrheim 
(2017), I then use the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, from the logit estimation and 
perform the matching using three different matching procedures: nearest-neighbor matching (in 
which the treated firm-year is matched with a certain number of controls that have the closet 
propensity score), kernel matching (in which the more similar the untreated observations are to the 
treated observations, the more weight they are given), and radius matching (in which each treated 
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observation is matched only with the control unit whose propensity score falls in a predefined 
neighborhood of the propensity score of that treated unit). 
Table 9 reports the average treatment effect estimates. Panel A reports the results using 
nearest-neighbor matching that allows each treated firm to be matched with four controls. The 
results are, however, robust to any number of matches between one and six. Column (I) of Panel 
A suggests that the average inventory turnover ratio would be 4.587 units higher if all firm-years 
were to have an active ERM program, as opposed to none had an active ERM program. Panels B 
and C show the results using kernel matching and radius matching, respectively. The results in 
Panel C are based on setting the radius limited to 0.1; nonetheless, the coefficients remain 
significant using any radius greater than or equal to 0.05. Overall, Table 9 suggests that the non-





THE MATURITY OF ERM 
While my baseline regression model documents the effects of ERM adoption on inventory 
turnover and the instrumental variable and the treatment effect models address concerns of 
endogeneity and self-selection bias, none of these models consider the impacts of changes in the 
quality of ERM program through time. As Eckles et al. (2014) suggest, since ERM implementation 
is a complex process, it takes time for the benefits of it to be fully realized. Assuming that ERM 
matures as time passes, the number of years past from the adoption of ERM is a sensible proxy for 
the quality of an ERM program. Based on this assumption, it is reasonable to expect the economic 
benefits of the ERM program to have a positive association with the number of years since ERM 
was initially adopted. In this capacity, I argue that as the quality of an ERM program improves 
through time, its impacts on inventory management performance magnifies. To test this argument, 
I develop two ERM maturity models.  
 ERM Maturity Dummies Using Baseline Regression Model  
First, I address the maturity of an ERM program based on my baseline regression model. 
Consistent with Eckles et al. (2014), I substitute ERM with a set of dummies defined to measure 
the maturity of an ERM program. ERM_Maturity-D1 is a dummy that takes the value of one within 
the first and second year of ERM adoption, and zero otherwise. ERM_Maturity-D2 is a dummy 
that takes the value of one within the third and fourth year of ERM adoption, and zero otherwise. 
ERM_Maturity-D3 is a dummy that takes the value of one after the fourth year of ERM adoption, 
and zero otherwise. Equation (4) shows the baseline regression model with ERM maturity 
dummies: 
InvtTurnRatioi,t = α + δ1ERM_Maturity-D1i,t + δ2ERM_Maturity-D2i,t + 
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δ3ERM_Maturity-D3i,t + γERM_Everi + βControlsi,t-1 + Year Dummies + Industry 
Dummies + εi,t  (Eq. 4) 
I present the results for this model in Panel A of Table 10. The coefficients on 
ERM_Maturity-D1, ERM_Maturity-D2, and ERM_Maturity-D3 are of my interest and are all 
significant at 5% level. Moreover, taking each dependent variable into account separately, there is 
always an increasing trend in the magnitude of the coefficients as I move from ERM_Maturity-D1 
to ERM_Maturity-D3. The results support my Hypothesis 2 that the economic effects of ERM 
adoption on inventory turnover strengthen as the ERM program evolves over time.  
 Categorical ERM Maturity Using Instrumental Variable Estimation  
To address endogeneity, I develop a two-stage least square method (2SLS) where 
ERM_Maturity is instrumented in the first-stage using the ratio of ERM-adopters within the firm’s 
industry-year (ERM_IndRatio), as the instrumental variable. In the first stage of this model, I 
regress ERM_Maturity on the instrumental variable (ERM_IndRatio), the vector of control 
variables defined in (2), and year and industry dummies. Results of the first stage are presented in 
column (I) of Panel B of Table 10. Consistent with my arguments, ERM_IndRatio has a significant 
positive association with ERM_Maturity.  
In the second stage, I regress inventory turnover ratio (Invt_Turnover and Invt_AdjTurn, in 
two separate regressions) on the predicted values of ERM_Maturity from the first stage, while 
including the same set of control variables and industry and year dummies as in the first stage. 
Columns (II) and (III) of Panel B of Table 10 represent the results of the second stage using 
Invt_Turnover and Invt_AdjTurn as the dependent variable, respectively. The positive and 
significant coefficients on ERM_Maturity suggest that even after addressing endogeneity, the 
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evolvement in the maturity ERM programs throughout time results in incremental improvements 





Among different measures of inventory productivity proposed in the literature, inventory 
turnover ratio and inventory impairment seem to be the two most commonly used measures (Feng 
et al. 2015). Thus far, I show that the adoption of ERM significantly increases inventory turnover 
ratio. In this section, as a robustness check, I test the association between ERM adoption and 
inventory impairment.  
Hendricks and Singhal (2009) document that excess inventory announcements are 
associated with significant negative stock market reactions. Larson et al. (2014) provide empirical 
evidence suggesting that inventory write-downs lead to severe negative impacts on firms' operating 
performance, and that extreme sales growth firms are more likely to experience a future inventory 
write-down. Feng et al. (2015) report a positive association between inventory impairment and 
inventory-related material weaknesses. Overall, a lower level of inventory impairment is an 
indicator of a better operational performance. With reference to my propositions on the association 
between ERM adoption and operational performance, I expect that ERM adoption lowers both the 
incidences and magnitude of inventory impairment, and that these impacts amplify throughout 
time. 
 Construction of Inventory Impairment Variables  
Inventory mismanagement can result in holdings of considerable amounts of excess or 
obsolete inventory with a market value below cost. Since U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) requires reporting inventory at the lower of cost or market, in certain cases, 
firms need to impair their inventory to its market value. This write-down of value is recorded as 
an operating cost and reduces the firm’s net income.  
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To collect impairment data, I manually search for any sign of inventory impairment in  
10-K filings of all firm-years in my final sample. Existing literature (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal 
2009; Larson et al. 2011; Allen et al. 2013) suggest searching for terms such as “obsolescence,” 
“obsolete,” “impairment,” “write-down,” and “write-off” within a few words of the word 
“inventory.” Impairment, however, can be stated using diverse phrases some of which cannot be 
captured by the aforementioned terms.14 As such, in addition to searching dozens of impairment-
related terms,15 I also check for the context around every appearance of the word “inventory” or 
“inventories” in 10-K filings in order to make sure that I capture as many incidences of inventory 
impairment as possible.  
Most firms report their inventory impairment charges in a direct and accurate manner even 
if the amount is relatively small. However, since it is not required to disclose the exact amount of 
inventory impairment, some firms tend not to report the impairment amount directly and precisely. 
As a result, in my final sample of 4,915 firm-years, 1,095 observations show circumstantial 
evidence of inventory impairment but the amount is not clearly stated. 16  To solve this 
inconsistency in reporting the impairment amount, I follow Allen et al. (2013) and remove these 
1,095 firm-year observations from my impairment dataset. Moreover, I exclude 95 firm-years with 
impairment records related to acquisition or natural catastrophe as these impairment charges are 
caused by exogenous forces that are not captured by my models. In addition, for 180 firm-years 
 
14 For instance, “inventories were written off,” and “reserve for obsolescence” (without the word inventory close to 
it). 
15 Including the terms suggested in literature, plus “inventory allowance,” “reserve(s) for inventory,” “reserve(s) for 
obsolescence,” “inventory shrinkage,” and “provision(s) for inventory”. 
16 For example, beginning and end of year “reserves for inventory” is reported, but the amount charged throughout 
the year in form of actual inventory write-down is not stated. In such cases, annual change in “reserves for 
inventory” can be easily computed; however, it is not clear how much of the change, if any, is due to actual 
inventory impairments. In some cases, the change in inventory reserves is huge, suggesting that the potential amount 
of impairment can probably be big. 
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no 10-K filings are reported on SEC. As a result, my final sample for the impairment analysis 
consists of 3,545 firm-years. In the final sample, I find 1,096 firm-year observations with an 
identifiable non-zero amount of impairment reported on SEC.  
To scale impairment amount, I divide it by the average annual FIFO inventory, where the 
annual average is computed using beginning and ending FIFO inventory. Out of 1,096 firm-year 
observations that reported non-zero inventory impairment amounts, 200 observations had 
impairments less than one percent of average annual FIFO inventory. These relatively small 
impairments are inevitable and mainly caused by the use of the allowance accounting method, and 
hence, do not necessarily imply inefficiency in inventory management. Consequently, in defining 
my impairment-related variables, I consider incidences of impairment amounts less than one 
percent of average annual FIFO inventory as zero. 17 The number of observations with impairment 
amounts between1% and 2%, 2% and 3%, 3% and 5%, 5% and 10%, and greater than 10% of 
average annual FIFO inventory is 170, 131, 218, 215, and 162, respectively 
My first impairment-related dependent variable, Impair_Magn, is defined as the annual 
amount of impaired inventory divided by average annual FIFO inventory, times a hundred, where 
annual impairments of less than one percent of average annual FIFO inventory are considered zero. 
My next impairment-related dependent variable, Impair_AdjMagn, is computed as the firm’s 
Impair_Magn less the median industry-year Impair_Magn, where industry is defined using Fama 
and French 30-industry classification. Finally, I define an indicator, Impair_Dum, that equals one 
 
17 Some firms report insignificant write-downs each and every year as a result of using indirect or allowance method 
in which managers estimate the expected amount of inventory that will go obsolete in the next fiscal year and 
expense it to a reserve account – which will be revised accordingly in each year. Since this is a routine annual 
process, the occurrence and magnitude of such small amounts of inventory write-downs should not be interpreted as 
a sign of low performance in inventory management. Hence, we suggest that these impairments should be treated as 
zero. Yet, as a robustness check, we re-define all of our impairment-related dependent variables, without considering 
even the smallest amounts of impairment as zero. The results are robust to this change, implying that ERM adoption 
significantly reduces the magnitude and possibility of all inventory impairments including routine insignificant 
write-downs. 
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if Impair_Magn is greater than zero (implying an impairment amount greater than one percent of 
average annual FIFO inventory), and zero otherwise. 18 
 Empirical Results Using Inventory Impairment Variables  
Following Feng et al. (2015) I use the exact same set of independent and fix effect variables 
in my inventory impairment tests as those I use in inventory turnover tests, and cluster standard 
errors at the firm level. Table 11 shows the results of my inventory impairment tests.  
Panel A of Table 11 shows the results for my baseline model. Since Impair_Magn is a 
truncated continuous variable with the lower bound of one, I use a tobit estimation in Column (I). 
For Impair_AdjMagn there is no limiting bound and hence I use OLS estimation in Column (II).  
Impair_Dum is an indicator that takes the values of either one or zero and therefore I use probit 
estimation in Column (III).  As expected, the coefficients are all significant and negative implying 
that ERM adoption is associated with a lower impairment magnitude, either unadjusted (columns 
(I)) or industry-adjusted (columns (I)), and a smaller likelihood of a notable inventory impairment 
(column (III)). Untabulated results of the marginal effects show that the adoption of ERM, on 
average, decreases the magnitude of inventory impairments by 0.753 percent of the average annual 
FIFO inventory. Given the average annual FIFO inventory of 1,681.4 million dollars in my final 
sample of 3,545 firm-years, this translates to an average annual cost savings of nearly 12.6 million 
dollars (= 1,681.4 × 0.753%). 
To address endogeneity and self-selection bias, I run a two-stage least square model and a 
treatment effect model using each of my impairment-related variables as the dependent variable. 
 
18 Impair_Magn, Impair_AdjMagn, and Impair_Dum are all defined based on setting “1% of average annual FIFO 
inventory” as the lower bound to consider an impairment non-zero. As a robustness check, we re-define these three 
variables using 2%, 3%, 5%, and 10% of average annual FIFO inventory as the lower bound. The results are robust 
to the change. In addition, the results are robust to the use of total assets (following Larson et al. 2011 and Allen et 
al. 2013) as the denominator to scale impairment amounts.  
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Panel B (Panel C) of Table 11 shows the results for my two-stage least square (treatment effect) 
model. The regression settings, including the use of ERM_IndRatio as the instrumental variable, 
are exactly the same as the ones used for inventory turnover tests. In Panels B and C, Column (I) 
reports the first stage results, and the negative and significant coefficients on ERM in columns (II) 
to (IV) show the negative association between ERM adoption and inventory impairment 
magnitude (Column (II)), industry-adjusted inventory impairment magnitude (Column (III)), and 
the likelihood of facing a notable inventory impairment (Column (IV)). 
Panel D of Table 11 reports the average treatment effect estimates when using  
impairment-related variables as the dependent variable. The procedure to run the matching is the 
same as the one explained in section 5.3 of Chapter 5. Each matching model is reported in a 
separate panel, and each column shows the dependent variable used. All the coefficients are 
negative and significant suggesting that the non-random assignment of ERM adoption to  
firms with lower inventory impairment (in terms of magnitude and/ or incidences) does not explain 
my findings. 
Next, I test for changes in the impacts of ERM adoption on inventory impairment as the 
ERM program matures using the same regression settings described in Chopater 6. In Table 11, 
Panel E shows the results of the OSL regression setting that includes my three ERM maturity 
dummies. The coefficients are all negative, significant, and with an increasing trend in the absolute 
value. Column (IV), for instance, suggests that ERM adoption decreases the likelihood of facing 
an inventory impairment greater that 1% of average annual FIFO inventory, and that this impact 
increases as time passes and the ERM program becomes more mature. Panel F of Table 11 shows 
that when I run the 2SLS regression using my categorical ERM maturity variable the results are 




COSO (2004) emphasizes the operations-related objective of ERM, providing a roadmap 
for firms to move toward a more complete risk management process that satisfies more needs than 
that of their internal control. COSO (2017) further stresses the role of day-to-day operational 
decisions in the integrated ERM framework in driving firm performance. In addition, the widely-
accepted risk quadrants include operational risk as one of the major categories of risk ERM 
addresses. Given the importance of firm operations in the ERM framework, I provide the first 
evidence on how ERM affects firm day-to-day, routine operations. I focus on inventory 
management since it is at the core of firm operations, and I measure it by inventory turnover ratio 
and impairment.  
Using a hand-collected sample of ERM adopters from firms that have ever been listed on 
the S&P 500 index between 2001 and 2017, I find that firms with ERM implementation experience 
an improvement in their inventory management during my sample period from 2004 to 2017. More 
specifically, I show that, controlling for ICFR, ERM adoption is associated with a greater inventory 
turnover ratio and less impairment. These results are robust to addressing the endogeneity concerns 
using an instrumental variable (2SLS) approach, treatment effect model, and propensity score 
matching.  
I also find that ERM’s effect on inventory management is more pronounced among firms  
with greater financial distress, with less investments in innovation, or with higher information 
asymmetries. Consequently, I document three channels thorugh which ERM adoption improves 
inventory turnover; risk mitigation, innovation boost, and information environment improvement. 
In addition, I show that ERM’s impacts on inventory management tend to increase as time 
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passes after the adoption. My research documents ERM’s real economic benefits to firms’ 
operations and provides evidence that ERM is broader than internal control functions by presenting 
the incremental effects of ERM on inventory management to ICFR. Given the under-appreciation 
and under-utilization of ERM in practice, my study calls for more attention from the standard-
setters and practitioners on ERM. 
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Figure 1: Historical Trend of ERM Adoption  
 
Note: This figure shows the historical trend of ERM adoption among S&P 500 firms in my final sample of 513 
unique firms. The vertical axis shows the cumulative number of firms in my sample that have adopted ERM. The 
sample is consisted of firms that appeared in S&P 500 index during any fraction of time between 2001 and 2017, 
excluding financial (6000 <= SIC <= 6999) and utility firms (4900 <= SIC <= 4999).  
 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
Description Firm-years 
Observations on all firms that appeared in the S&P 500 index during any fraction of 
time from 2001 to 2017 12,367 
    Less: Financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) 2,234 
    Less: Utility firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) 838 
    Less: Observations with missing information on internal control variables  2,634 
    Less: Observations with missing values on explanatory variables  1,746 
Final sample  4,915 
Note: This table presents the sample selection process. The final sample includes 4,915 firm-years (513 unique 
firms) over the 2004 – 2017 period. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean StDev 25th Median 75th 
ERM 4,915 0.418 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ERM_Ever 4,915 0.681 0.466 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ERM_IndRatio 4,915 0.401 0.266 0.154 0.405 0.611 









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
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Variable N Mean StDev 25th Median 75th 
Invt_AdjTurn 4,915 5.525 23.760 -1.548 -0.002 2.098 
GrossMargin 4,915 41.768 20.582 26.214 39.332 56.175 
CapitalIntensity 4,915 8.215 1.519 7.183 8.088 9.256 
Size 4,915 8.944 1.263 8.071 8.839 9.719 
Book-to-Market 4,915 0.391 0.299 0.198 0.325 0.503 
ROA 4,915 0.064 0.080 0.034 0.067 0.105 
Loss 4,915 0.122 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SalesGrowth 4,915 6.182 17.970 -1.710 5.372 12.669 
SalesVolatility 4,915 0.145 0.126 0.065 0.108 0.177 
Age 4,915 3.385 0.712 2.890 3.434 3.892 
ForeignSales 4,915 0.161 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Segments 4,915 1.488 0.315 1.386 1.386 1.609 
Auditor 4,915 0.989 0.105 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Invt_MWIC 4,915 0.004 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rev_MWIC 4,915 0.005 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other_MWIC 4,915 0.036 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The sample includes 
2004 – 2017 observations for firms that appeared in S&P 500 index anytime from 2001 to 2017, excluding financial 
(6000 <= SIC <= 6999) and utility (4900 <= SIC <= 4999) firms. See the Appendix for variable definitions. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 percent and 99 percent. 
 
Table 3: Univariate Differences across ERM Status 
 (I) ERM = 1  N = 2,053 
(II) ERM = 0 
N = 2,862 Difference (I) - (II) 
 Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Invt_Turnover 15.187 6.099 13.033 5.136 2.154*** 0.964*** 
Invt_AdjTurn 6.291 0.035 4.976 -0.150 1.315** 0.186*** 
ERM_IndRatio 0.576 0.583 0.275 0.227 0.301*** 0.356*** 
GrossMargin 40.430 38.560 42.729 39.798 -2.298*** -1.239* 
CapitalIntensity 8.689 8.644 7.874 7.777 0.815*** 0.867*** 
Size 9.303 9.204 8.685 8.614 0.618*** 0.591*** 
Book-to-Market 0.381 0.316 0.398 0.333 -0.017* -0.016** 
ROA 0.059 0.060 0.068 0.072 -0.009*** -0.011*** 
Loss 0.117 0.000 0.126 0.000 -0.009 0.000 
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 (I) ERM = 1  N = 2,053 
(II) ERM = 0 
N = 2,862 Difference (I) - (II) 
SalesGrowth 4.102 3.906 7.675 6.680 -3.572*** -2.773*** 
SalesVolatility 0.135 0.100 0.152 0.117 -0.017*** -0.017*** 
Age 3.509 3.714 3.297 3.258 0.212*** 0.457*** 
ForeignSales 0.141 0.000 0.175 0.000 -0.034** 0.000*** 
Segments 1.508 1.609 1.473 1.386 0.036*** 0.223*** 
Auditor 0.998 1.000 0.983 1.000 0.015*** 0.000 
Invt_MWIC 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
Rev_MWIC 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
Other_MWIC 0.028 0.000 0.041 0.000 -0.013 0.000 
Note: This table presents the univariate difference across ERM status for the sample firms. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 percent and 99 percent. Statistical 
significance of difference in means is based on t-test. Statistical significance of difference in medians is based on a 





Table 4: Pearson (bottom) and Spearman (top) Correlation Coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ERM (1)  0.521 0.573 0.079 0.065 -0.048 0.266 0.251 -0.036 -0.083 
ERM_Ever (2) 0.521  0.145 0.125 0.082 -0.078 0.219 0.232 0.007 -0.039 
ERM_IndRatio (3) 0.579 0.156  0.060 0.044 -0.053 0.207 0.179 -0.088 -0.067 
Invt_Turnover (4) 0.037 0.019 0.031  0.628 -0.331 0.291 0.196 0.050 -0.161 
Invt_Adj-Turn (5) 0.025 0.002 0.025 0.950  -0.233 0.078 0.090 -0.014 -0.067 
GrossMargin (6) -0.050 -0.076 -0.057 -0.135 -0.124  -0.199 -0.316 -0.209 0.327 
CapitalIntensity (7) 0.267 0.222 0.201 0.081 -0.010 -0.185  0.766 0.134 -0.133 
Size (8) 0.248 0.228 0.175 -0.017 -0.063 -0.298 0.780  0.044 -0.021 
Book-to-Market (9) -0.018 -0.005 -0.063 -0.017 -0.042 -0.202 0.117 0.025  -0.414 
ROA (10) -0.053 -0.024 -0.030 -0.062 -0.041 0.288 -0.062 0.053 -0.345  
Loss (11) -0.008 -0.053 0.007 0.026 0.028 -0.155 -0.032 -0.140 0.213 -0.683 
SalesGrowth (12) -0.135 -0.070 -0.167 0.024 0.035 0.138 -0.150 -0.084 -0.126 0.285 
SalesVolatility (13) -0.078 -0.049 -0.083 -0.058 -0.018 -0.251 -0.141 0.025 0.094 -0.056 
Age (14) 0.146 0.103 0.140 -0.119 -0.105 -0.081 0.316 0.298 0.006 -0.014 
ForeignSales (15) -0.037 0.008 -0.035 -0.003 -0.006 0.036 -0.004 -0.039 0.043 -0.020 
Segments (16) 0.061 0.063 0.010 -0.199 -0.169 -0.071 0.139 0.220 0.054 -0.024 
Auditor (17) 0.061 0.068 0.041 0.024 0.012 0.001 0.118 0.063 -0.037 0.044 
Invt_MWIC (18) -0.033 -0.042 -0.046 -0.024 -0.020 -0.044 -0.053 -0.044 0.008 -0.058 
Rev_MWIC (19) -0.037 -0.045 -0.043 -0.023 -0.021 -0.026 -0.048 -0.042 -0.012 -0.051 




  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
ERM (1) -0.008 -0.162 -0.116 0.181 -0.037 0.066 0.061 -0.033 -0.037 -0.048 
ERM_Ever (2) -0.053 -0.062 -0.081 0.136 0.008 0.069 0.068 -0.042 -0.045 -0.030 
ERM_IndRatio (3) 0.002 -0.209 -0.123 0.170 -0.030 0.016 0.038 -0.051 -0.049 -0.076 
Invt_Turnover (4) 0.011 0.001 -0.026 -0.058 -0.028 -0.068 0.030 -0.016 -0.016 -0.021 
Invt_Adj-Turn (5) -0.015 0.027 0.058 -0.054 -0.028 0.022 -0.001 -0.024 -0.036 -0.023 
GrossMargin (6) -0.149 0.097 -0.253 -0.103 0.031 -0.103 0.004 -0.046 -0.028 -0.008 
CapitalIntensity (7) -0.013 -0.159 -0.191 0.344 -0.017 0.140 0.122 -0.051 -0.047 -0.055 
Size (8) -0.112 -0.098 -0.039 0.327 -0.049 0.216 0.048 -0.034 -0.034 -0.053 
Book-to-Market (9) 0.131 -0.122 0.060 0.032 0.028 0.097 -0.029 0.008 -0.017 0.011 
ROA (10) -0.552 0.287 -0.045 -0.032 -0.010 -0.050 0.029 -0.067 -0.064 -0.103 
Loss (11)  -0.251 0.109 -0.028 0.020 -0.063 -0.045 0.028 0.055 0.078 
SalesGrowth (12) -0.241  0.078 -0.194 0.005 -0.078 0.009 0.003 -0.004 0.008 
SalesVolatility (13) 0.079 0.070  -0.113 -0.008 -0.081 -0.030 0.028 0.030 0.033 
Age (14) -0.022 -0.170 -0.135  0.009 0.346 0.070 -0.003 -0.003 -0.016 
ForeignSales (15) 0.020 0.003 -0.019 0.007  0.071 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.013 
Segments (16) -0.049 -0.079 -0.111 0.318 0.078  -0.003 0.041 0.026 0.021 
Auditor (17) -0.045 0.006 -0.046 0.071 0.004 -0.005  -0.066 -0.039 -0.018 
Invt_MWIC (18) 0.028 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.038 -0.066  0.665 0.470 
Rev_MWIC (19) 0.055 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.025 -0.039 0.665  0.493 
Other_MWIC (20) 0.078 0.010 0.025 -0.012 0.014 0.025 -0.021 0.483 0.511  
Notes: This table presents the Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlation coefficients for the main variables of interest used in our study. Bold values are significant at p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed) 
and italicized values are significant at p ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed). See the appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 5: Baseline Model 





























































Year FE  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,915 4,915 
Clusters 513 513 
Adj. R-squared 0.344 0.171 
Note: This table reports results of the baseline regression of the effect of ERM adoption (ERM) on inventory 
turnover (column (I)) and industry-adjusted inventory turnover (Column (II)). The model is defined in equation (1). 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 percent and 99 
percent. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. Test statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6: Cross-Sectional Variation in the Effect of ERM Adoption 
Panel A: Impact of risk on the association between ERM adoption and inventory turnover 
 O-Score 
 Invt_Turnover Invt_AdjTurn 
  High Subsample Low Subsample High Subsample Low Subsample 
ERM 
6.131*** 0.194 5.805*** 0.1903 
(3.3) (0.11) (4.09) (0.16) 
ERM_Ever 
-4.614 1.807 -4.514 1.938 
(-1.47) (0.94) (-1.43) (1.01) 
GrossMargin 
-0.475*** -0.378*** -0.475*** -0.380*** 
(-4.51) (-3.92) (-4.52) (-3.88) 
CapitalIntensity 
1.808 3.515** 1.758 3.529** 
(0.85) (2.16) (0.82) (2.15) 
Size 
-4.925** -4.302** -4.823** -4.404** 
(-2.35) (-2.01) (-2.28) (-2.05) 
Book-to-Market 
-7.280** -3.136 -7.378** -2.868 
(-2.12) (-0.76) (-2.15) (-0.70) 
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Panel A: Impact of risk on the association between ERM adoption and inventory turnover 
 O-Score 
 Invt_Turnover Invt_AdjTurn 
  High Subsample Low Subsample High Subsample Low Subsample 
ROA 
7.579 6.564 7.053 7.234 
(0.55) (0.39) (0.52) (0.42) 
Loss 
-2.088 1.262 -2.154 1.511 
(-0.93) (0.35) (-0.93) (0.41) 
SalesGrowth 
0.045 0.079** 0.036 0.079** 
(0.98) (2.09) (0.81) (2.07) 
SalesVolatility 
-3.127 -5.384 -3.319 -5.564 
(-0.50) (-0.96) (-0.53) (-0.99) 
Age 
-0.103 -2.282* -0.120 -2.196* 
(-0.06) (-1.71) (-0.07) (-1.65) 
ForeignSales 
-0.619 -0.435 -0.591 -0.255 
(-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.20) (-0.18) 
Segments 
-7.165* -6.799 -7.085* -6.981 
(-1.73) (-1.19) (-1.70) (-1.23) 
Auditor 
-0.987 -1.232 -1.206 -1.13 
(-0.23) (-0.56) (-0.28) (-0.52) 
Invt_MWIC 
-2.668 4.433 -2.545 4.232 
(-0.95) (1.27) (-0.89) (1.17) 
Rev_MWIC 
-2.185 -2.963 -1.978 -2.493 
(-0.58) (-1.05) (-0.54) (-0.98) 
Other_MWIC 
-0.805 -0.741 -0.863 -0.658 
(-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.65) (-0.50) 
Constant 
69.203*** 49.552*** 63.216*** 44.799*** 
(4.72) (3.02) (4.30) (2.71) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,372 2,379 2,372 2,379 
Clusters 388 372 388 372 
Adj. R-squared 0.354 0.356 0.180 0.200 
Test of Difference  
in ERM coefficient 
Chi-square = 6.76 Chi-square = 6.01 




Panel B: Impact of innovation on the association between ERM adoption and inventory turnover 
 R&DExpnd 
 Invt_Turnover Invt_AdjTurn 
  High Subsample Low Subsample High Subsample Low Subsample 
ERM 
0.267 5.566** 0.246 5.266** 
(0.28) (2.32) (0.25) (2.22) 
ERM_Ever 
-0.369 -3.275 -0.356 -3.085** 
(-0.23) (-0.90) (-0.22) (-2.20) 
GrossMargin 
-0.279** -0.332** -0.277** -0.331*** 
(-2.38) (-2.42) (-2.37) (-7.45) 
CapitalIntensity 
-1.259 1.239 -1.220 1.226 
(-1.02) (0.68) (-0.98) (1.53) 
Size 
1.149 -4.912** 1.098 -4.854*** 
(0.72) (-2.29) (0.68) (-5.50) 
Book-to-Market 
-8.486** -3.247 -8.423** -3.202* 
(-2.43) (-0.86) (-2.41) (-1.65) 
ROA 
-10.136 19.947 -10.279 20.566* 
(-0.92) (1.11) (-0.93) (1.86) 
Loss 
1.087 1.085 1.148 1.117 
(0.44) (0.40) (0.46) (0.50) 
SalesGrowth 
0.076* 0.051 0.078* 0.042 
(1.94) (1.15) (1.97) (1.26) 
SalesVolatility 
-6.330 3.486 -6.656 3.172 
(-1.03) (0.49) (-1.08) (0.75) 
Age 
0.519 -1.474 0.549 -1.529* 
(0.64) (-0.62) (0.69) (-1.89) 
ForeignSales 
-0.873 -0.825 -0.883 -0.649 
(-0.81) (-0.22) (-0.82) (-0.41) 
Segments 
-9.883* -3.276 -10.059* -3.023 
(-1.77) (-0.62) (-1.81) (-1.54) 
Auditor 
3.365 0.067 3.503 0.056 
(1.54) (0.02) (1.61) (0.01) 
Invt_MWIC 
-4.613 0.091 -4.965 0.709 
(-1.56) (0.01) (-1.52) (0.07) 
Rev_MWIC 
-3.515 1.336 -3.142 0.544 
(-1.37) (0.19) (-1.25) (0.03) 
 
47 
Panel B: Impact of innovation on the association between ERM adoption and inventory turnover 
 R&DExpnd 
 Invt_Turnover Invt_AdjTurn 
  High Subsample Low Subsample High Subsample Low Subsample 
Other_MWIC 
1.217 -4.281** 1.340 -4.404* 
(0.80) (-2.46) (0.83) (-1.73) 
Constant 
29.338** 62.098*** 23.881* 64.242*** 
(2.06) (2.86) (1.68) (6.04) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,454 2,461 2,454 2,461 
Clusters 272 266 272 266 
Adj. R-squared 0.181 0.385 0.114 0.226 
Test of Difference  
in ERM coefficient 
Chi-square = 4.32 Chi-square = 3.96 
p-value = 0.038 p-value = 0.046 
 
Panel C: Impact of information asymmetry on the association between ERM adoption and inventory 
turnover 
 ForecastDispersion 
 Invt_Turnover Invt_AdjTurn 
  High Subsample Low Subsample High Subsample Low Subsample 
ERM 
5.339*** 0.901 5.138** 0.696 
(2.64) (0.47) (2.56) (0.36) 
ERM_Ever 
-2.881 -1.066 -2.787 -0.943 
(-1.28) (-0.42) (-1.24) (-0.37) 
GrossMargin 
-0.434*** -0.412*** -0.436*** -0.413*** 
(-5.44) (-3.73) (-5.47) (-3.70) 
CapitalIntensity 
4.022*** 0.247 4.019*** 0.307 
(3.27) (0.12) (3.24) (0.15) 
Size 
-7.036*** -0.116 -7.000*** -0.211 
(-4.63) (-0.05) (-4.61) (-0.09) 
Book-to-Market 
-3.585 -12.128** -3.349 -12.432** 
(-1.28) (-2.03) (-1.21) (-2.05) 
ROA 
4.503 13.004 4.596 13.011 
(0.38) (0.74) (0.39) (0.74) 
Loss 
-0.871 -1.162 -0.881 -0.786 
(-0.46) (-0.27) (-0.46) (-0.18) 
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Panel C: Impact of information asymmetry on the association between ERM adoption and inventory 
turnover 
 ForecastDispersion 
 Invt_Turnover Invt_AdjTurn 
  High Subsample Low Subsample High Subsample Low Subsample 
SalesGrowth 
0.079** 0.083 0.073** 0.082 
(2.49) (1.59) (2.32) (1.57) 
SalesVolatility 
-8.145** 4.163 -8.646** 4.368 
(-1.98) (0.48) (-2.11) (0.50) 
Age 
-1.155 -0.285 -1.207 -0.203 
(-0.82) (-0.15) (-0.86) (-0.11) 
ForeignSales 
-2.000 -1.442 -1.780 -1.530 
(-1.24) (-0.54) (-1.09) (-0.57) 
Segments 
-5.129 -12.098** -4.815 -12.233** 
(-1.26) (-2.02) (-1.19) (-2.04) 
Auditor 
0.107 -0.788 0.216 -1.054 
(0.03) (-0.25) (0.07) (-0.33) 
Invt_MWIC 
-3.395 -12.116 -3.230 -11.880 
(-1.02) (-1.46) (-0.95) (-1.54) 
Rev_MWIC 
-2.910 6.382 -2.746 5.633 
(-0.84) (0.87) (-0.82) (0.82) 
Other_MWIC 
-1.134 1.150 -1.109 1.371 
(-0.90) (0.74) (-0.88) (0.87) 
Constant 
69.682*** 40.816*** 63.718*** 35.741*** 
(5.21) (3.05) (4.76) (2.65) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2408 2414 2408 2414 
Clusters 409 375 409 375 
Adj. R-squared 0.337 0.405 0.201 0.216 
Test of Difference  
in ERM coefficient 
Chi-square = 3.06 Chi-square = 3.06 
p-value = 0.080 p-value = 0.080 
Note: This table reports results of cross-sectional variation in the effect of ERM adoption (ERM) on inventory 
turnover (Invt_Turnover) and industry-adjusted inventory turnover (Invt_AdjTurn), using baseline regression 
settings (defined by equation (1)). Panel A presents results related to Ohlson O-score (O-score). Panel B presents 
results related to R&D expenditure (R&DExpnd). Panel C presents results related to analyst forecast dispersion 




Table 7: Instrumental Variable Model 






 13.774** 13.591** 
 (2.21) (2.17) 
ERM_Ever  
0.454*** -6.633* -6.513* 
(25.68) (-1.90) (-1.85) 
GrossMargin 
0.001 -0.421*** -0.421*** 
(1.14) (-5.50) (-5.49) 
CapitalIntensity 
0.038*** 2.271* 2.264* 
(2.95) (1.82) (1.80) 
Size 
0.001 -4.361*** -4.355*** 
(-0.01) (-3.12) (-3.11) 
Book-to-Market 
0.007 -5.521** -5.453** 
(0.25) (-2.00) (-1.97) 
ROA 
-0.169 9.163 9.466 
(-1.19) (0.82) (0.84) 
Loss 
-0.003 -0.459 -0.400 
(-0.11) (-0.23) (-0.20) 
SalesGrowth 
0.001 0.080** 0.076** 
(-0.45) (2.57) (2.46) 
SalesVolatility 
0.041 -4.049 -4.282 
(0.63) (-0.87) (-0.92) 
Age 
0.002 -0.983 -1.002 
(0.13) (-0.76) (-0.78) 
ForeignSales 
-0.028 -1.105 -1.031 
(-1.42) (-0.62) (-0.57) 
Segments 
0.002 -7.747** -7.653** 
(0.06) (-2.16) (-2.14) 
Auditor 
0.017 -0.793 -0.760 
(0.29) (-0.39) (-0.37) 
Invt_MWIC 
0.053 -4.470 -4.392 
(0.88) (-1.53) (-1.52) 
Rev_MWIC 
0.052 -2.154 -2.071 
(0.75) (-0.64) (-0.66) 
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-0.005 -0.795 53.197*** 
(-0.24) (-0.80) (4.74) 
ERM_IndRatio 
0.794***   
(11.00)   
Constant 
-0.613*** 58.939*** 51.021*** 
(-4.63) (5.26) (4.72) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,915 4,915 4,915 
Clusters 513 513 513 
Adj. R-squared 0.544 0.326 0.149 
Note: This table reports results of the two-stage least squares model of the effect of ERM adoption (ERM) on 
inventory turnover (column (II)) and industry-adjusted inventory turnover (Column (III)). First-stage results are 
reported in columns (I). See the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
extreme 1 percent and 99 percent. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at 
the firm level. Test statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8: Treatment Effect Model 






  8.665*** 8.197*** 
 (3.77) (3.56) 
ERM_Ever  
  -0.260 -0.149 
 (-0.31) (-0.18) 
GrossMargin 
  -0.351*** -0.350*** 
 (-16.44) (-16.35) 
CapitalIntensity 
  3.830*** 3.798*** 
 (7.90) (7.80) 
Size 
  -5.176*** -5.148*** 
 (-9.82) (-9.72) 
Book-to-Market 
  -3.987*** -3.841*** 
 (-3.19) (-3.06) 
ROA 
  5.738 5.959 
 (0.95) (0.99) 
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  -1.909 -1.857 
 (-1.40) (-1.36) 
SalesGrowth 
  0.087*** 0.082*** 
 (4.51) (4.21) 
SalesVolatility 
  -1.296 -1.637 
 (-0.47) (-0.59) 
Age 
  -1.406*** -1.404*** 
 (-2.86) (-2.85) 
ForeignSales 
  0.231 0.332 
 (0.27) (0.38) 
Segments 
  -5.492*** -5.436*** 
 (-4.53) (-4.46) 
Auditor 
  -2.141 -1.909 
 (-0.58) (-0.52) 
Invt_MWIC 
-0.067 0.920 0.768 
(-0.09) (0.14) (0.12) 
Rev_MWIC 
-0.196 0.337 0.550 
(-0.20) (0.05) (0.08) 
Other_MWIC 
-0.111 -0.541 -0.591 
(-0.93) (-0.39) (-0.42) 
DailyRtnVol 
-0.503***     
(-6.21)   
CashRatio 
-0.768***     
(-2.98)   
Opacity 
-0.790***     
(-4.69)   
CashFlowVol 
-0.143***     
(-3.53)   
Z-score 
-0.075***     
(-6.24)   
ValueChange 
0.053     
(0.81)   
Leverage 
0.090     
(0.49)   
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-0.082     
(-0.96)   
ERM_IndRatio 
3.502***     
(14.74)   
Mills Ratio 
  -3.246** -3.071** 
 (-2.36) (-2.23) 
Constant 
-4.653*** 48.796*** 43.125*** 
(-10.79) (9.22) (8.12) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,237 4,237 4,237 
Note: This table reports results of the treatment effect model of the impacts of ERM adoption (ERM) on inventory 
turnover (II) and industry-adjusted inventory turnover (III). First-stage (defined by equations (3)) results are reported 
in column (I). See the Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 
percent and 99 percent. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm 
level. Test statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9: Propensity Score Matching 
 (I) Invt_Turnover 
(II) 
Invt_AdjTurn 
Panel A: Nearest-neighbor Matching 
ERM = 1 vs. ERM = 0 
4.587*** 4.057*** 
(4.02) (3.78) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,902 4,902 
Panel B: Kernel Matching 
ERM = 1 vs. ERM = 0 
4.801*** 4.194*** 
(3.81) (3.22) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,902 4,902 
Panel C: Radius Matching 




 (I) Invt_Turnover 
(II) 
Invt_AdjTurn 
Panel C (con’t) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,902 4,902 
Note: This table reports results of the estimates of differences in firms’ inventory turnover (Invt_Turnover) and 
industry-adjusted inventory turnover (Invt_AdjTurn) between the treatment group (ERM = 1) and the control group 
(ERM = 0). The matched sample is constructed using nearest-neighbor (I), kernel (II), and radius (III) score 
matching given by a probit model in which ERM is the dependent variable. See the Appendix for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 percent and 99 percent. The Standard errors are 
obtained using 200 bootstrap replications. Test statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10: ERM Maturity Models 
Panel A: OLS regression  



































Panel A: OLS regression  

































Year FE  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,915 4,915 
Clusters 513 513 
Adj. R-squared 0.345 0.172 
 
Panel B: 2SLS regression  







  7.310** 7.212** 
 (2.17) (2.13) 
ERM_Ever 
1.171*** -8.934** -8.783* 
(24.15) (-2.00) (-1.96) 
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Panel B: 2SLS regression  







0.001 -0.421*** -0.421*** 
(0.74) (-5.50) (-5.49) 
CapitalIntensity 
0.117*** 1.944 1.942 
(3.07) (1.46) (1.45) 
Size 
-0.001 -4.352*** -4.346*** 
(-0.03) (-3.08) (-3.07) 
Book-to-Market 
-0.009 -5.363* -5.296* 
(-0.12) (-1.93) (-1.91) 
ROA 
-0.302 9.047 9.351 
(-0.79) (0.80) (0.83) 
Loss 
0.039 -0.787 -0.724 
(0.51) (-0.39) (-0.35) 
SalesGrowth 
-0.01 0.086*** 0.082*** 
(-1.29) (2.75) (2.63) 
SalesVolatility 
0.04 -3.783 -4.019 
(0.23) (-0.81) (-0.86) 
Age 
0.009 -1.028 -1.047 
(0.25) (-0.79) (-0.81) 
ForeignSales 
-0.059 -1.061 -0.987 
(-1.09) (-0.59) (-0.54) 
Segments 
-0.015 -7.606** -7.514** 
(-0.15) (-2.12) (-2.09) 
Auditor 
0.049 -0.918 -0.884 
(0.34) (-0.41) (-0.40) 
Invt_MWIC 
0.084 -4.349 -4.273 
(0.53) (-1.46) (-1.45) 
Rev_MWIC 
0.17 -2.676 -2.586 
(0.96) (-0.77) (-0.78) 
Other_MWIC 
-0.009 -0.800 -0.765 
(-0.17) (-0.79) (-0.73) 
ERM_IndRatio 
1.497***     
(7.73)   
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Panel B: 2SLS regression  







-1.804 66.360*** 60.783*** 
(-5.51) (5.24) (4.78) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,915 4,915 4,915 
Clusters 513 513 513 
Adj. R-squared 0.140 0.311 0.130 
Note: Panel A (Panel B) reports results of the ERM maturity baseline (2SLS) regression of the effects of ERM 
maturity, proxied by three dummy variables (one categorical variable), on inventory turnover and industry-adjusted 
inventory turnover. See the Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the extreme 
1 percent and 99 percent. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 11: Effects of ERM Adoption on Inventory Impairment 








-3.030*** -0.702*** -0.327** 
(-2.94) (-2.84) (-2.56) 
ERM_Ever 
-1.920* -0.497 -0.269* 
(-1.75) (-1.42) (-1.81) 
GrossMargin 
0.088*** 0.033*** 0.009** 
(2.75) (3.10) (2.48) 
CapitalIntensity 
-1.904** -0.396 -0.282*** 
(-2.50) (-1.54) (-3.19) 
Size 
0.975 0.282 0.132 
(1.16) (1.06) (1.39) 
Book-to-Market 
3.312** 0.737* 0.454** 
(2.26) (1.82) (2.29) 
ROA 
-0.792 -1.484 0.107 
(-0.14) (-0.79) (0.15) 
Loss 
3.582*** 1.247*** 0.338** 
(2.82) (3.21) (2.12) 
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-0.020 -0.002 -0.003* 
(-1.23) (-0.30) (-1.66) 
SalesVolatility 
-2.986 0.187 -0.604 
(-0.97) (0.23) (-1.52) 
Age 
-0.130 -0.047 -0.034 
(-0.17) (-0.27) (-0.34) 
ForeignSales 
1.759** 0.403* 0.275*** 
(2.28) (1.66) (2.61) 
Segments 
-0.580 -0.507 0.085 
(-0.32) (-1.04) (0.38) 
Auditor 
-0.181 0.676 -0.401 
(-0.06) (0.58) (-0.95) 
Invt_MWIC 
5.638* 1.358 0.867** 
(1.93) (0.92) (2.10) 
Rev_MWIC 
0.546 1.523 -0.019 
(0.20) (0.99) (-0.05) 
Other_MWIC 
0.154 0.034 0.045 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.38) 
Constant 
-3.341 0.186 0.300 
(-0.47) (0.10) (0.34) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,545 3,545 3,545 
Clusters 415 415 407 
Pseudo/Adj. R-squared 0.088 0.143 0.185 
 
Panel B: 2SLS regression 









  -1.708* -1.912** -0.262* 
  (-1.79) (-2.04) (-1.94) 
ERM_Ever 
0.455*** -0.014 0.077 0.005 
(22.01) (-0.02) (0.14) (0.07) 
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Panel B: 2SLS regression 









0.001 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.003*** 
(0.83) (3.16) (3.16) (2.83) 
CapitalIntensity 
0.053*** -0.326 -0.328 -0.072*** 
(3.73) (-1.20) (-1.21) (-2.87) 
Size 
-0.014 0.247 0.265 0.037 
(-0.87) (0.92) (0.98) (1.48) 
Book-to-Market 
0.005 0.770* 0.737* 0.130** 
(0.16) (1.88) (1.83) (2.36) 
ROA 
-0.035 -1.554 -1.541 -0.038 
(-0.19) (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.19) 
Loss 
0.008 1.283*** 1.259*** 0.089** 
(0.25) (3.19) (3.26) (2.00) 
SalesGrowth 
0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.10) (-0.20) (-0.32) (-1.59) 
SalesVolatility 
0.041 0.290 0.202 -0.156 
(0.54) (0.36) (0.25) (-1.55) 
Age 
0.001 -0.045 -0.044 -0.015 
(0.01) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.65) 
ForeignSales 
-0.019 0.447* 0.385 0.086*** 
(-0.84) (1.82) (1.59) (2.81) 
Segments 
0.022 -0.516 -0.509 0.021 
(0.51) (-1.07) (-1.05) (0.37) 
Auditor 
0.095 0.687 0.774 -0.127 
(0.92) (0.67) (0.74) (-0.99) 
Invt_MWIC 
0.056 1.260 1.420 0.243* 
(0.86) (0.86) (0.98) (1.80) 
Rev_MWIC 
0.143* 1.607 1.708 0.051 
(1.88) (1.04) (1.13) (0.38) 
Other_MWIC 
-0.026 0.037 -0.006 0.013 
(-0.96) (0.09) (-0.02) (0.36) 
ERM_IndRatio 
0.767***       
(9.37)       
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Panel B: 2SLS regression 









-0.801*** 0.705 0.675 0.587** 
(-4.98) (0.39) (0.37) (2.43) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,545 3,545 3,545 3,545 
Clusters 415 415 415 415 
Adj. R-squared 0.177  0.159 0.131 0.164 
 
Panel C: Treatment effect model 









  -1.970*** -2.161*** -0.190*** 
  (-3.84) (-4.24) (-3.38) 
ERM_Ever 
  -0.426** -0.442** -0.079*** 
  (-2.41) (-2.52) (-4.05) 
GrossMargin 
  0.026*** 0.026*** 0.002*** 
  (6.09) (6.13) (4.37) 
CapitalIntensity 
  -0.317*** -0.327*** -0.078*** 
  (-3.19) (-3.31) (-7.17) 
Size 
  0.236** 0.254** 0.043*** 
  (2.21) (2.39) (3.65) 
Book-to-Market 
  0.708*** 0.648** 0.134*** 
  (2.78) (2.57) (4.81) 
ROA 
  -1.377 -1.603 0.016 
  (-1.06) (-1.24) (0.11) 
Loss 
  1.313*** 1.257*** 0.093*** 
  (4.73) (4.56) (3.04) 
SalesGrowth 
  -0.002 -0.003 -0.001*** 
  (-0.62) (-0.79) (-2.80) 
SalesVolatility 
  -0.074 -0.156 -0.215*** 
  (-0.13) (-0.28) (-3.45) 
Age 
  -0.132 -0.128 -0.028** 
  (-1.26) (-1.23) (-2.45) 
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Panel C: Treatment effect model 









  0.584*** 0.526*** 0.111*** 
  (3.34) (3.03) (5.78) 
Segments 
  -0.686*** -0.703*** -0.001 
  (-2.74) (-2.83) (-0.04) 
Auditor 
  0.593 0.596 -0.204** 
  (0.72) (0.73) (-2.25) 
Invt_MWIC 
  1.462 1.629 0.267* 
  (1.13) (1.26) (1.88) 
Rev_MWIC 
  -1.377 -1.222 -0.151 
  (-0.99) (-0.88) (-1.00) 
Other_MWIC 
  -0.081 -0.136 0.014 
  (-0.26) (-0.43) (0.39) 
DailyRtnVol 
-0.503***       
(-6.21)       
CashRatio 
-0.768***       
(-2.98)       
Opacity 
-0.790***       
(-4.69)       
CashFlowVol 
-0.143***       
(-3.53)       
Z-score 
-0.075***       
(-6.24)       
ValueChange 
0.053       
(0.81)       
Leverage 
0.090       
(0.49)       
InstOwnership 
-0.082       
(-0.96)       
ERM_IndRatio 
3.502***       
(14.74)       
Mills Ratio 
  0.785** 0.894*** 0.067** 
  (2.56) (2.93) (1.99) 
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Panel C: Treatment effect model 









-4.653*** 1.633 1.226 0.733*** 
(-10.79) (1.42) (1.07) (5.81) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,054 3,054 3,054 3,054 
 





Panel D1: Nearest-neighbor Matching  
ERM = 1 vs. ERM = 0 
-1.121*** -1.093*** -0.156*** 
(-9.15) (-9.06) (-10.99) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,534 3,534 3,534 
Panel D2: Kernel Matching  
ERM = 1 vs. ERM = 0 
-1.120*** -1.127*** -0.148*** 
(-9.30) (-8.46) (-9.02) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,534 3,534 3,534 
Panel D3: Radius Matching  
ERM = 1 vs. ERM = 0 
-1.113*** -1.060*** -0.154*** 
(-8.94) (-8.75) (-9.20) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,534 3,534 3,534 
 








-2.341*** -0.553** -0.301*** 
(-2.63) (-2.32) (-2.80) 
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-2.704** -0.618** -0.320** 
(-2.49) (-2.21) (-2.39) 
ERM_Maturity-D3 
-4.327*** -0.898*** -0.497*** 
(-2.94) (-2.70) (-2.68) 
ERM_Ever 
-1.539 -0.426 -0.209 
(-1.35) (-1.17) (-1.37) 
GrossMargin 
0.087*** 0.033*** 0.009** 
(2.74) (3.10) (2.47) 
CapitalIntensity 
-1.851** -0.387 -0.275*** 
(-2.43) (-1.50) (-3.12) 
Size 
0.946 0.280 0.129 
(1.13) (1.05) (1.36) 
Book-to-Market 
3.357** 0.741* 0.461** 
(2.28) (1.83) (2.31) 
ROA 
-0.518 -1.428 0.138 
(-0.09) (-0.76) (0.20) 
Loss 
3.592*** 1.256*** 0.338** 
(2.83) (3.23) (2.13) 
SalesGrowth 
-0.020 -0.002 -0.003* 
(-1.25) (-0.33) (-1.70) 
SalesVolatility 
-2.921 0.166 -0.601 
(-0.95) (0.20) (-1.52) 
Age 
-0.100 -0.046 -0.030 
(-0.13) (-0.27) (-0.31) 
ForeignSales 
1.742** 0.405* 0.272** 
(2.22) (1.65) (2.56) 
Segments 
-0.595 -0.507 0.082 
(-0.33) (-1.04) (0.37) 
Auditor 
0.019 0.710 -0.377 
(0.01) (0.61) (-0.90) 
Invt_MWIC 
5.695* 1.361 0.876** 
(1.95) (0.92) (2.13) 
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0.614 1.545 -0.003 
(0.23) (1.00) (-0.01) 
Other_MWIC 
0.150 0.028 0.041 
(0.16) (0.07) (0.36) 
Constant 
-3.940 0.078 0.219 
(-0.56) (0.04) (0.24) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,545 3,545 3,545 
Clusters 415 415 407 
Adj. R-squared 0.089 0.143 0.188 
 
Panel F:  2SLS regression using categorical ERM maturity 









  -0.926* -1.040** -0.142* 
 (-1.77) (-2.00) (-1.91) 
ERM_Ever 
1.182*** 0.302 0.432 0.054 
(20.53) (0.41) (0.60) (0.53) 
GrossMargin 
0.001 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.003*** 
(0.38) (3.11) (3.10) (2.76) 
CapitalIntensity 
0.156*** -0.272 -0.267 -0.063** 
(3.78) (-0.96) (-0.94) (-2.34) 
Size 
-0.043 0.232 0.247 0.035 
(-0.93) (0.85) (0.91) (1.36) 
Book-to-Market 
0.012 0.773* 0.739* 0.130** 
(0.13) (1.89) (1.83) (2.37) 
ROA 
0.143 -1.362 -1.324 -0.009 
(0.29) (-0.73) (-0.71) (-0.04) 
Loss 
0.067 1.331*** 1.312*** 0.096** 
(0.74) (3.27) (3.35) (2.15) 
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Panel F:  2SLS regression using categorical ERM maturity 









-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001* 
(-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.38) (-1.66) 
SalesVolatility 
0.015 0.234 0.139 -0.165 
(0.08) (0.29) (0.17) (-1.62) 
Age 
0.005 -0.040 -0.039 -0.014 
(0.11) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.62) 
ForeignSales 
-0.012 0.468* 0.409* 0.089*** 
(-0.19) (1.89) (1.66) (2.88) 
Segments 
0.046 -0.511 -0.502 0.022 
(0.37) (-1.05) (-1.02) (0.38) 
Auditor 
0.323 0.823 0.928 -0.106 
(1.59) (0.79) (0.88) (-0.81) 
Invt_MWIC 
0.163 1.315 1.482 0.252* 
(0.96) (0.89) (1.02) (1.84) 
Rev_MWIC 
0.416** 1.748 1.866 0.072 
(2.16) (1.13) (1.22) (0.53) 
Other_MWIC 
-0.082 0.006 -0.040 0.008 
(-1.34) (0.02) (-0.11) (0.22) 
ERM_IndRatio 
1.415***       
(6.43)    
Constant 
-2.14*** -0.573 -1.336 0.365 
(-5.30) (-0.29) (-0.66) (1.31) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,545 3,545 3,545 3,545 
Clusters 415 415 415 415 
Adj. R-squared 0.570 0.148 0.116 0.144 
Note: This table reports the results of the tests on the association between ERM adoption/maturity and inventory 
impairment measured by impairment magnitude (Impair_Magn), industry adjusted impairment magnitude 
(Impair_AdjMagn), and impairment dummy (Impair_Dum). Panel A reports results of the baseline model using tobit 
(Column (I)), OLS (Column (II)), and probit (Column (III)) regression. Panels B, C, and D, report results of the two-
stage least squares model, the treatment effect model, and propensity score matching. Panel E reports results of 
ERM maturity baseline model where ERM maturity dummies are used in tobit (Column I), OLS (Column II), and 






Variable Name Description 
ERM  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has an active ERM program in that year, and 0 otherwise. 
ERM_Ever A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has ever adopted ERM, and 0 otherwise. 
ERM_IndRatio 
The ratio of ERM adoption for the firm’s industry-year, computed as total 
number of ERM adopters for the firm’s industry-year, divided by the total 
number of firms in that industry-year. 
ERM_Maturity 
A categorical variable that takes the value of 0, 1, 2, and 3, before the adoption 
of ERM, within the first and second years of ERM adoption, within the third 
and fourth years of ERM adoption, and after the fourth year of ERM adoption, 
respectively. 
ERM_Maturity-D1 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 within the first and second year of ERM adoption, and zero otherwise.  
ERM_Maturity-D2 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 within the third and fourth year of ERM adoption, and zero otherwise. 
ERM_Maturity-D3 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the fourth year of ERM adoption, and zero otherwise. 
Invt_Turnover 
Inventory turnover ratio measured as annual cost of sales (Compustat COGS), 
divided by average annual inventory (Compustat INVT) over the same year, 
where inventory is averaged using the beginning and ending inventory of that 
year. (on a FIFO basis). 
Invt_AdjTurn 
The firm-specific Invt_Turnover less the median Invt_Turnover for the firm’s 
industry-year, where industry is defined using Fama and French 30-industry 
classification. 
Impair_Magn 
The amount of inventory impaired throughout the year, divided by average 
annual FIFO inventory, times 100, where annual impairments of less than 1% 
of average annual FIFO inventory are considered zero. 
Impair_AdjMagn 
The firm-specific Impair_Magn less the median Impair_Magn for the firm’s 
industry-year, where industry is defined using Fama and French 30-industry 
classification. 
Impair_Dum A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Impair_Magn is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. 
GrossMargin 
Percentage of gross profit, measured as sales (Compustat REVT) less cost of 
sales (Compustat COGS) divided by sales (Compustat REVT), times 100 (on a 
FIFO basis). 
CapitalIntensity End of year natural logarithm of gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat PPEGT).  
Size Natural logarithm of total annual sales (Compustat REVT). 
Book-to-Market End of year book value of equity divided by end of year market value of equity. 
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Variable Name Description 
ROA 
Annual earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat IB), divided by average 
annual total assets (Compustat AT) over the same year, where total assets are 
averaged using the beginning and ending total assets of that year. 
Loss A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if annual net income (Compustat NI) is less than zero, and 0 otherwise. 
SaleGrowth Percentage of growth in annual sales (Compustat REVT) from year t-1 to year t. 
SaleVolatility 
The standard deviation of annual sales (Compustat REVT) divided by average 
total assets (Compustat AT) over the prior seven years (requiring at least three 
non-missing observations), where total assets are averaged using the beginning 
and ending total assets of that year. 
Age Natural logarithm of the number of years that a company is covered by CRSP. 
ForeignSale A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports foreign sales (Compustat FCA) in that year, and 0 otherwise. 
Segments Natural logarithm of the total number of geographic and operating segments. 
Auditor A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm hires one of the four largest audit firms (Audit Analytics AUDITOR_FKEY < 5), and 0 otherwise. 
Inventory-MW 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports an inventory-
related material weakness in internal control in year t, and 0 otherwise. (The 
dummy’s value is 1 if any of NOTEFF_ACC_REAS_KEYS, NOTEFF_ 
FINFRAUD_KEYS, or NOTEFF_OTHER_REAS_KEYS equal 32). 
Revenue-MW 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports a revenue-related 
material weakness in internal control in year t, and 0 otherwise. (The dummy’s 
value is 1 if any of NOTEFF_ACC_REAS_KEYS, NOTEFF_ 
FINFRAUD_KEYS, or NOTEFF_OTHER_REAS_KEYS equal 39). 
Other-MW 
Natural logarithm of the number of material weaknesses in internal control 
excluding those related to inventory or revenue. (That is, excluding material 
weaknesses incidents where NOTEFF_ ACC_REAS_KEYS and 
NOTEFF_FINFRAUD_KEYS and NOTEFF_OTHER_REAS_KEYS are all 
not equal to 32 or 39). 
O-Score Ohlson O-score (Ohlson 1980) 
R&DExpnd Annual research and development expense (Compustat XRD) divided by annual sales (Compustat REVT) 
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